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Statement of Facts 
1. The facts are not in dispute. However, Burgess 
makes the statement at page 11 of his brief that "All the 
parties in this case know that [his] condition is not 
stable." The undisputed evidence is to the contrary. 
Burgess was given and accepted an impairment rating which 
means he reached maximum medical improvement. He continues 
to work. No physician has recommended any additional 
surgery. There is no objective evidence of instability in 
his condition. (R. 48, 51, 71, 271.) 
SUMMARY OF THE REPLY ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98, (1990) (Appendix 1 in the 
principal brief of the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah) is 
a statute of limitation. The Commission should not be 
allowed to obviate the clear intent of the legislature to 
bar stale claims that are not ripe for adjudication within 
six years from the date of an industrial accident. An 
Application for Hearing in which an applicant makes no 
claims ripe for adjudication is not a tool contemplated by 
the legislature to permanently toll the running of the six-
year period. 
The Commission's order in this matter has the effect of 
eliminating the limitation period established by the 
3 
Legislature. It gives all injured workers open-ended relief 
not intended by the Legislature. That is contrary to the 
plain language of the statutes. It is contrary to the basic 
intent and purpose of the Act to provide certain balanced 
rights between injured workers and their employers. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PURPOSE OF AN APPLICATION FOR HEARING IS 
TO RESOLVE DISPUTES OVER CLAIMS RIPE FOR 
ADJUDICATION AND NOT TO SERVE AS A PROTECTION OF 
RIGHTS FOR FUTURE SPECULATIVE CLAIMS. 
Respondent Labor Commission contends that Burgess has 
satisfied the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-98 by 
simply filing an Application for Hearing (Respondent Labor 
Commission brief at 7). 
In order for the Commission2 to consider claims made by 
injured workers, the applicants must present issues that are 
ripe for adjudication. "Ripeness occurs when a conflict 
over the application of a legal provision has sharpened into 
an actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations 
between the parties thereto." Boyle v. National Fire Ins. 
Co., 866 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted). 
Both the Commission and Burgess concede that the claims 
advanced by Burgess in his amended Application for Hearing 
have no supportive evidence and are not ripe for hearing. 
2As noted by the Respondent Labor Commission, recent 
legislative changes effective July 1, 1997 recodified the 
Workers' Compensation Act and created the Labor Commission to 
replace the Industrial Commission. This brief will follow the 
convention set in the Labor Commission's brief and refer to both 
entities as "the Commission." 
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(Order on Motion to Amend, R. at 294; Appellants' brief at 
Appendix 12). 
The Commission's administrative rule3 regarding 
submission of an Application for Hearing and in effect at 
the time of Burgess's filing, states, in part, as follows: 
The Application for Hearing is the request for 
agency action. All such applications shall 
include supporting medical documentation of the 
claim where there is a dispute over medical 
issues. . . . Whenever a claim for compensation 
benefits is denied by an employer or insurance 
carrier, the burden rests on the applicant to 
initiate the action by filing an Application for 
Hearing with the Commission. 
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.A, -4.B. 
This rule is in accordance with the Administrative 
Procedures Act and provides a mechanism for the Commission 
to determine the disputed legal interests of an applicant 
regarding workers' compensation benefits. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-3 (Supp. 1996, 1993). 
However, allowing Burgess's amended Application for 
Hearing, containing only claims that are conceded as 
speculative, subverts the Commission's purpose as a forum 
for disputed or denied benefits. The purpose of the 
Application for Hearing is to present actionable claims for 
resolution on the merits of the case before the Commission, 
3The administrative rules promulgated by the Commission were 
renumbered effective July 1, 1997. This rule, while currently 
re-numbered as R602-2-1.A, -l.B, is substantively unchanged. 
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and to allow the defendants in such actions the opportunity 
to respond. The Application for Hearing is not intended as 
a de facto protection of rights document. 
II. THE RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT THAT THE 
APPLICATION FOR HEARING TOLLS THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-98 
EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATES THE LIMITATION PERIOD 
ESTABLISHED BY THE LEGISLATURE. 
Respondents Burgess and the Labor Commission assert 
that the filing of an Application for Hearing within six 
years of the date of injury invokes the continuous 
jurisdiction of the Commission to award benefits for an 
indefinite period beyond the six-year limitations period 
stated in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-98 (Burgess brief at 10, 
Commission brief at 9). The practical effect of such action 
allows every injured worker to bypass the provisions of 
section 98 merely by filing an Application for Hearing with 
no claims presently ripe for adjudication. Notably, the 
Commission would be burdened with the processing of 
Applications for Hearing filed strictly as some sort of 
protection of right document and not to adjudicate presently 
existing disputes. Furthermore, the Commission, by 
exercising the continuous jurisdiction it espouses, will be 
responsible for holding open such claims indefinitely. 
Aside from such procedural burdens, filing such claims will 
effectively countermand the purpose of the Legislature in 
7 
providing a limitations period for claims in section 35-1-
98. 
Statutory time limitations "are designed to promote 
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of 
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has 
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared." Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 
634 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). However, there are 
statutory provisions which toll the time limitations under 
certain specific circumstances. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. § 
108(a) (1993) (tolling effect of bankruptcy petition on 
lawsuits against the debtor); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-36, -
39 (1992) (tolling time limitations for age minority and 
mental incompetence). In addition, under certain 
circumstances the court-established discovery rule operates 
as a means to toll the commencement of a limitation period 
until the injured party was reasonably aware of his or her 
injury. See Sevy, 902 P.2d at 634; Avis v. Board of Review, 
837 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1992). In fact, the 
Legislature has codified the discovery rules in workers' 
compensation cases involving occupational disease, i.e., 
when the injured worker knew or should have known that the 
disease resulted form his or her employment activities. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-103 (Supp. 1996) . 
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The Legislature saw fit to establish a six-year period 
during which injured workers must bring their claims for 
workers' compensation benefits. To allow Burgess, or any 
injured worker who simply files an Application for Hearing, 
to toll indefinitely his or her claims for additional but 
speculative benefits would impose precisely the hardships 
that a time limitation was intended to avoid, i.e., loss of 
evidence and witnesses due to the passage of time. This 
concept is critical in the context of workers' compensation 
claims which may rely exclusively on medical evidence. It 
is common practice among medical providers to purge their 
records, including diagnostic films, after a period of five 
to ten years, thus making it impossible to assemble an 
accurate and complete set of medical records on a case which 
has been lying dormant in the Commission's files. 
In the instant case, by analogy the statutory language 
of section 35-1-98 fails to rise to the level of the 
specific language found in other statutes, such as section 
78-12-36, that delineate circumstances that actively toll 
indefinitely a limitations period. 
Nor is there a basis to allow Burgess to toll the six-
year statute of limitations merely on his contrived and 
strained reading of the dicta contained in Avis, 852 P.2d at 
588, and Middlestadt v. Industrial Comm'n, 852 P.2d 1012, 
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1014 (Utah App. 1993) (Respondent Burgess's brief at 11). 
This Court, in both cases, referred to the filing of a claim 
for permanent partial disability as a result of the 
petitioner's recent surgery; in other words, there was 
objective evidence of further impairment, albeit unrated. 
While an injured worker may "timely file within the 
statutory period with or without a disability rating in 
hand," Avis, 852 P.2d at 588, logic demands that there be 
some medical evidence to support the claim other than the 
mere speculation that, at some unknown point in time, the 
injured worker may have a greater degree of impairment. 
Contrary to Burgess's assertion that "the parties know that 
[his] condition is not stable," (Respondent Burgess's brief 
at 11), the objective medical evidence clearly indicates his 
condition is stable. (R. 48, 51) Burgess's attempt to 
stretch the "disability rating in hand" scenario to justify 
filing a claim for permanent total disability status is 
particularly misplaced, given the evidence and decision-
making process essential for a finding of permanent total 
disability. In the instant case, there is not a scintilla 
of evidence supporting Burgess's additional claims. There 
is no anticipated surgery and his condition is stable. He 
was given an impairment rating and continues to work. There 
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is no objective medical evidence that he will sustain a 
greater impairment. (R. 48, 51, 71, 271.) 
Burgess, without any apparent basis, states that the 
Legislature intended to allow an injured worker to assert 
claims beyond limitation periods in order to remedy the 
"inequity" in the law that precludes an injured worker from 
asserting a common law tort action (Respondent Burgess's 
brief at 10). On the contrary, the Workers' Compensation 
Act is recognized as a comprehensive, no-fault scheme of 
benefits not analogous to a lump sum judgment of a civil 
personal injury action. Instead, the Act pays multiple 
benefits over limited periods of time without the res 
judicata effect of a single judgment. Stoker v. Workers 
Compensation Fund, 889 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1994). In other 
words, an injured worker trades the speculative gain from a 
common law tort action for defined benefits paid over a 
closed period of time without regard to fault, including the 
possible fault of the injured worker. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the assertion of the Respondents, merely 
filing an Application for Hearing is not sufficient to 
extend the Commission's jurisdiction beyond the six-year 
limitation in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-98. An Application for 
Hearing provides a means of adjudicating presently existing 
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disputes over workers' compensation benefits and is not 
intended to be used solely as a protection of rights 
document for unripe and speculative claims. 
Further, use of an Application for Hearing which 
asserts unripe claims and is used solely to invoke a 
continuous and indefinite jurisdiction of the Commission 
subverts the intent of the Legislature in establishing a 
limitations period. 
DATED this £A day of March, 1998. 
JAMES R. BLACK & ASSOCIATES 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF 
UTAH 
By: A^yf, 
Barbara Sharp 
Attorneys for Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah 
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